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VIOLENCE, AUTHORITY, AND THE
STATE IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS OF
CONDOMINIUM SUDAN*
JUST IN W I L L I S
University of Durham
A B S T R ACT. While British colonial rhetoric consistently identiﬁed tradition as the basis of legitimate
authority, colonial practice actually produced far-reaching changes in the nature of government in Britain’s
African possessions. New institutions, and new holders of power, emerged in African societies in response to the
particular needs of colonial administration. This article explores this transformation in one part of Con-
dominium Sudan, which was eﬀectively a British possession but which has often been excluded from historical
discussions of the impact of colonialism because of its unique status. The NubaMountains have recently gained
notoriety as a particularly bloody theatre of Sudan’s long post-colonial civil war ; while some have sought
to explain this as the result of British policies which encouraged racial antagonism, the article suggests that
here, as elsewhere in Africa, the real legacy of colonial rule was the creation of new kinds of local government
which sat uneasily with enduring local ideas of spiritual power and proper authority.
I have watched an old generation give place to a new in India and I have seen how easily
vague political unrest swept over backward peoples simply because we had allowed the
old forms to crumble away. Yet the native states in India remain safe and secure in the hands
of hereditary rulers.1
Even before Lugard established ‘Indirect Rule ’ as the creed of colonial admin-
istration, oﬃcials in Britain’s African possessions had tended to conservatism in
political matters. The governor of British East Africa had warned in 1910 that
abandonment of established authority would leave the tiny minority of white
administrators alone to face the ‘rabble ’; planning the administration of Sudan, the
man who was to become governor-general insisted in 1898 that ‘ [i]t is a matter of
great importance that the inhabitants should realize that their local traditions
and former system of patriarchal government will be duly respected ’.2 Across
* I should like to thank colleagues in the seminars at Humboldt University, the African Studies
Centre at Cambridge University, and at the School of Oriental and African Studies for their comments;
and also the anonymous referees of the Historical Journal. The article also beneﬁted from a Durham-
Humboldt exchange programme, funded by the British Council and DAAD, ref. ARC 1160.
1 Minute by J. Maﬀey, governor-general of the Sudan, 1 Jan. 1927, Sudan Archive, Durham (SAD)
723/5/36-9.
2 G. Mungeam, British rule in Kenya, 1895–1912: the establishment of administration in the East Africa
Protectorate (Oxford, 1966), pp. 214, 226–67; Wingate, ‘Notes on civil administration in the Sudan’,
n.d. 1897/8, SAD 266/1/43-8.
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the continent, the overriding imperative to maintain empire on the cheap dictated
a heavy reliance on African agents of administration; and the lesson of India
inclined Britons to prefer ‘ traditional ’ rulers as their agents, and to shun the
unsavoury ﬁgure known in East Africa as the ‘man in trousers ’ and in Sudan as
‘ the eﬀendi ’. The enthusiasm for traditional authority – and the consequent inven-
tion of tradition – was to reach a peak after the First World War, when reliance
on a sort of eﬀective indirect rule became commonplace even where the ideology
of ‘ IR’ was not proclaimed.3 Even in the years of the ‘ second colonial occu-
pation’, after 1945, when empire reconstrued itself as an exercise in development
and representative government, administrators privately (and not so privately)
doubted the wisdom of such innovations in ‘nose-counting’.4
But the innate anti-modernism of administrators (‘Catonism’, as Berman has
called it) had unintended consequences ; as Iliﬀe has argued, indirect rule was
‘conservative in origin but radical in eﬀect ’.5 Colonial administration was ‘pre-
fectural ’, functioning rather like a military chain of command and requiring
obedience, above all else. Administrators needed – and oﬀered power to – those
who were willing to defy propriety and challenge norms when the district com-
missioner needed labour, or tax.6 Consequently, multiple new kinds of authority
emerged behind the occasionally frantic insistence on an authenticity derived from
tradition. Mamdani has characterized all these as ‘decentralized despotism’, a
spurious traditional power freed from long-established social constraints ; less
sweepingly judgemental accounts have none the less argued that these forms
were innovative, and closely associated with the accumulative ambitions of local
‘chiefs ’; and that they had profound political consequences.7
Studies of this reshaping of African authority under the guise of colonial con-
servatism have largely neglected Africa’s largest political unit : Sudan. This is
symptomatic, for Sudan is an awkward child, historiographically as well as his-
torically. The fecundity of the Nile has drawn Sudan into straddling the desert
boundary which elsewhere so neatly divides North Africa from the rest of the
continent ; when Africa was partitioned, this was neither colony nor protectorate,
3 The classic statement on invention is T. Ranger, ‘The invention of tradition in colonial Africa’, in
E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The invention of tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211–62, which draws
heavily on J. Iliﬀe, A modern history of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979). J. Cell, ‘Colonial rule ’, in Judith
Brown and Wm Roger Louis, eds., Oxford history of the British empire, IV (Oxford, 1999), pp. 232–54.
4 C. Dundas, African crossroads (London, 1955), p. 39.
5 B. Berman, ‘Bureaucracy and incumbent violence: colonial administration and the origins of the
‘‘Mau Mau’’ emergency’, in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, Unhappy valley : conﬂict in Kenya and Africa
(London, Nairobi, and Athens, OH, 1992), pp. 227–64, at p. 234; Iliﬀe, A modern history of Tanganyika,
p. 318.
6 Cell, ‘Colonial rule ’, p. 242; Berman, ‘Bureaucracy and incumbent violence’, p. 231 ; Ranger,
‘The invention of tradition in colonial Africa’, pp. 247–59.
7 M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject (Princeton, 1996), pp. 37–61; B. Berman, ‘Structure and process
in the bureaucratic states of colonial Africa’, in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy valley, pp. 140–76,
at p. 152; J. Iliﬀe, Africans : history of a continent (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 200–2.
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but rather a Condominium of Britain and Egypt.8 The bitterness of Sudan’s post-
independence civil war has heightened the sense of distinction, for here historical
debate endlessly returns to a simple question: did administration under the
Condominium entrench ethnic and racial divides, and so doom the Sudan to
conﬂict?9
In tracing the emergence of new forms of local authority in one small corner of
the Condominium Sudan, this article will seek to undermine this sense of
distinctiveness, and to reframe this recurring question. The concerns, and the
intellectual milieu, of the Britons who dominated the administration of the
Condominium were actually strikingly similar to those of colonial oﬃcials else-
where in Africa : they perceived the same problems, pursued similar policies – and
created similar contradictions and ironies.10 And the question is not straight-
forwardly that of whether the British sowed the seeds of racial strife. It is rather :
why did the forms of local authority developed under the Condominium prove so
unstable, and so ill-ﬁtted to the demands of the post-colonial state?
I
In 1934 Arthur Vicars-Miles, a veteran British administrator, set down some
helpful notes for oﬃcials newly posted to the Nuba Mountains of Sudan’s Kor-
dofan province.
It is easy for the newcomer to forget that only ten years ago many of the most enthusiastic
pro-Government Meks [chiefs] regarded the Government with the utmost suspicion, if not
as their actual enemy. I have heard new arrivals say that they cannot understand why there
were constant patrols ; but I hope that this note will make them realise that the administra-
tors of the past were for the most part as peace-loving as themselves, but they had to place
the problem of public security ﬁrst. In any new country you must establish law and order
before you can develop either culture or trade, and in doing so some eggs, as the saying
goes, have to be broken.11
The governmental omelette had been made with a particularly ﬁrm hand in
the Nuba Mountains : ‘patrols ’ in the Nuba Mountains caused extensive death
and destruction.12 Leaving aside this circumlocutory elision of colonial violence,
8 The genesis and terms of the Condominium are best explained in M. Daly, Empire on the Nile : the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 11–18.
9 For opposing sides in this debate, see Mudaththir Abd al Rahim, Imperialism and nationalism in the
Sudan: a study in constitutional and political development, 1899–1956 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 7–9, 227; D. Wai, ‘Pax
Britannica and the Southern Sudan: the view from the theatre’, African Aﬀairs, 79 (1980), pp. 375–96.
10 M.Daly, Imperial Sudan: the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934–1956 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 26, suggests
that the Sudan was structurally excluded from participating in many ‘colonial ’ debates in the 1930s,
even though its administrators faced many of the same policy issues as their fellows in the colonial
service. 11 Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’, p. 1, SAD 631/10/1-64.
12 I have so far identiﬁed twenty-seven patrols in theNubaMountains which involvedmore than one
company of soldiers: Tegali, 1903; Daier, 1904; Kitra, 1904; Shat-el-Saﬁa, 1905; Nyima, 1908 and 1917 ;
Burham, 1908; Katla, 1909, 1910, and 1925; Tagoi, 1910; Tira Lumman, 1910; Kimla, 1911 ; Krongo
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Vicars-Miles’s comments were problematic in another way. There had been a
decline in large-scale violence in themountains : in 1918, a report said of one part of
theNubaMountains that ‘administrative oﬃcials visiting … carry their life in their
hands’,13 while in the 1930s British administrators toured peacefully, escorted by
only three policemen – two of whom were needed to carry the co-domini’s ﬂags.14
But the decline was muchmore gradual thanVicars-Miles suggested : the real peak
of ‘patrol ’ violence had been between 1905 and 1912, with a brief resurgence in
1917–19; and the last major patrol came in 1945, years after the ‘Notes on Nuba
Administration’ were written.15
Vicars-Miles’s story of a recent rapprochement between meks and government
was intended as narrative of political legitimation through tradition : decades of
fruitless reliance on deculturated upstarts improperly appointed asmeks had caused
chronic violence, but by 1930 the government had begun co-operating with those
who held ‘ traditional ’ authority within a distinctive ‘Nuba culture ’.16 Recent
scholarship on the Nuba Mountains has oﬀered two contrasting interpretations of
this process. One sees this ‘Nuba renaissance’ as a particularly iniquitous example
of the divisive racialization of politics and administration which characterized
Condominiumpolicy, and undid the best eﬀorts of the post-colonial state at nation-
building; the other suggests that this period entrenched a centralized and auth-
oritarian local form of the state which, maintained by the post-colonial state,
provoked the long, appalling, war which has killed and displaced tens of thousands
of people in the Nuba Mountains in the last two decades.17 Focusing on one
particular area of the mountains – the Nyima hills, in the north-western corner of
Nuba – this article will argue rather that the development of colonial adminis-
tration here ﬁtted clearly into a wider pattern, evident elsewhere in the Sudan and
across British Africa. As an initial phase of large-scale violence slipped into a
routine of localized coercion, administrators believed that they had established an
accommodation with tradition which would be stable and enduring. In practice,
they were co-operating with their chosen African agents in creating novel kinds of
Bakheit, 1911 ; Heiban, 1911; Tira el Akhdar, 1912, 1913, 1915, and 1922; Tendilla, 1913; Mandal, 1914;
Miri, 1915; Koalib/Lira, 1919; Tuleishi, 1926, 1945; Julud, 1926; Lafofa, 1929. See also Daly, Empire
on the Nile, pp. 129–33.
13 Sudan Intelligence Report (SIR) No. 293, Dec. 1918, Public Record Oﬃce (PRO) FO 371/3724.
There had been a similar comment in Reports on the ﬁnances, administration and condition of the Sudan (GGR),
1909, p. 748. 14 Bell to ‘Mother and Dad’, 12 Mar. 1934, SAD 697/11/55-9.
15 Owen to Father, 12–13 Jan. 1945, SAD 414/15/81.
16 Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’, p. 41, SAD 631/10/1-64.
17 Kamal Osman Salih, ‘British policy and the accentuation of inter-ethnic divisions: the case of the
Nuba Mountains region of Sudan, 1920–1940’, African Aﬀairs, 89 (1990), pp. 417–36; Ahmed Abdel
Rahim Nasr, ‘British policy towards Islam in the Nuba Mountains, 1920–1940’, Sudan Notes and Records
(SNR), 52 (1971), pp. 23–33;M. Saavedra, ‘Ethnicity, resources and the colonial state : politics in theNuba
Mountains, 1950s to 1990s’, in E. Stiansen and M. Kevane, Kordofan invaded : peripheral incorporation and
social transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden, 1998), pp. 223–53. Compare with African Rights, Facing
genocide : the Nuba of Sudan (London, 1995).
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power, and remaking authority, in ways which drew eclectically on multiple forms
of authority, local and colonial.
I I
Nyima is a little cluster of eight hills in the north-western corner of the wider scatter
of peaks – ‘ jebels ’, in the Anglo-Arabic of the Condominium – whichmake up the
Nuba Mountains ; its populace have come to be known as the Nyimang.18 These
hills were the target of two major ‘patrols ’. In 1908, eleven companies of infantry
and Camel Corps attacked several of the hills, in an attempt to force the return of
captives and livestock which Nyima raiders had taken from other hill communities
or from Arabic-speaking nomads in the surrounding plains.19 Over a week, 100
cattle and 500 sheep and goats were seized or destroyed and around fortymen from
the Nyima area killed ; standing crops were burned and houses destroyed.20 At
the end of this ‘Nyima patrol ’ the governor of Kordofan conﬁdently foresaw ‘no
more serious trouble in the Western hills ’;21 but in 1917 an attempt to enforce the
payment of tribute and the surrender of young men wanted for raiding ended in
the death of a British oﬃcer in a confused skirmish.22 An even larger patrol –
‘Patrol No. 32’, by oﬃcial designation – resulted. It involved more than 3,000
soldiers, with artillery and maxim guns.23 By late January 1918 more than 500 men
from the hills had been killed ; the mek of Nyima and a ritual specialist allied to
him had surrendered and been publicly hanged for rebellion ; over 1,000 cattle
had been seized, crops and houses destroyed; and a further 500 young men had
been conscripted into the army and marched away.24
I I I
In the ﬁrst two decades of the Condominium, one phrase recurred constantly in
discussions of policy towards the Nuba Mountains. The populace must be ‘ shown
the power of the Government ’; and disobedience could only be a sign that the
people ‘have no idea of the power of the Government ’.25 Behind this phrase lay an
18 S. Nadel, The Nuba: an anthropological study of the hill tribes in Kordofan (London, 1947), p. 362;
R. Stevenson, The Nuba people of Kordofan province (Khartoum, 1984), pp. 82–4: in fact the people of the
hills refer to Nyima as ‘seven hills ’, but there is an eighth, a ‘half-hill ’ called Shirowa or Sultan.
19 London Gazette, 27 Sept. 1910: copy in SAD 701/25/330.
20 Lloyd to civil sec., 5Nov. 1908; andLempriere,OCNyimaPatrol to adjutant general, 3Nov. 1908,
SAD 701/25/251-4. 21 Lloyd, governor to civil sec., 23 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/284-91.
22 SIR No. 274, Apr. 1917, PRO FO 371/3199.
23 L. Smith, ‘Report on Patrol No. 32’, SAD 643/13/1-47.
24 SIR No. 283, Feb. 1918, PRO FO 371/3199.
25 Cromer’s introduction to GGR, 1905, pp. 51–2; GGR, 1908, p. 182; Lloyd, governor to civil sec.,
23 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/284-91; SIR No. 270, Jan. 1917, PRO WO 106/6225; SIR No. 294,
Jan. 1919, PRO WO 33/997; Kordofan province annual report, 1904, SAD 701/25/159-63.
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uncomfortable awareness, as acute here as it was in most colonial states in Africa
in the early twentieth century, that the ‘power of the Government ’ really was quite
limited, and that only occasionally could administrators deploy suﬃcient coercive
resources to impose their will.26 While the Condominium had an unusually large
colonial army in this period – around 13,000–14,000 men – this was still rather
few to hold down 2million square kilometres of territory.27Administrators – many
of them seconded army oﬃcers, in the ﬁrst decades of the Condominium – knew
that the populace of the Nuba Mountains possessed thousands of riﬂes, and they
shrank from exposing ‘ the small military and police forces available for the pur-
pose’ to casualties from snipers concealed in rocks and caves.28And so at times they
avoided confrontation: ‘The Government took what it could get without ﬁghting’,
recalled one, in retrospect.29 But almost all shared the belief that this enforced
cautiousness courted disaster, for they were wont to read every local lapse of
authority as the prelude to insurrection, every unsolved cattle theft as the ﬁrst sign
of an uprising.30 In the Sudan, recent history fuelled the fear that unpunished
insubordination would lead rapidly to revolt : the belief that the Mahdist revolt
had grown from a local jacquerie which might easily have been suppressed had
been instilled in all oﬃcials.31 ‘ [T]hose who ﬂout Government must be punished’,
insisted Wingate, governor-general from 1900 to 1916;32 and in urging the im-
portance of an immediate and violent response to signs of recalcitrance in theNuba
Mountains, he darkly noted: ‘ that sort of disaﬀection spreads like wildﬁre ’.33
Warned of the adverse comment which ‘patrols ’ might attract in London,Wingate
put on record some pious remarks about his reluctance to use force ; but reminded
subordinates that ‘Government authority and prestige must be maintained, and
if there is no way out of it, of course we must have a punitive mission and show
that we mean to be masters. ’34 And, taking advantage of Sudan’s unusual status
and the consequent lack of supervision from London, he ensured a routine sup-
pression of information on potentially gory details and discouraged press
enquiries.35
26 GGR, 1905, p. 15 ; Berman, ‘Bureaucracy and incumbent violence’, p. 33.
27 By comparison, theKing’s AfricanRiﬂes (stationed inUganda, British East Africa, andNyasaland)
had 104 British oﬃcers and 4,579 African other ranks at its creation in 1902; reductions, particularly
in 1911, saw its strength fall to 73 British oﬃcers and 2,325 other ranks by 1914: H. Moyse-Bartlett,
The King’s African Riﬂes : a study in the military history of East and Central Africa (Aldershot, 1956), pp. 129, 262.
See also Iliﬀe, A modern history of Tanganyika, pp. 240–1.
28 SIR No. 212, Mar. 1912, PRO WO 106/6224.
29 J. A. Gillan, Some aspects of Nuba administration (Khartoum, 1931), p. 40.
30 London Gazette, 27 Sept. 1910, SAD 701/25/330.
31 Daly, Empire on the Nile, pp. 119, 124, 128.
32 Wingate to Asser, 27 Oct. 1910, SAD 298/1/63.
33 GGR, 1904, p. 12; GGR, 1908, p. 43; Wingate to Kitchener, 19 Feb. 1914, SAD 157/2/35-8.
34 Cromer to Wingate, 21 Feb. 1905, SAD 276/2/31-4; Wingate to Asser, 12 Sept. 1910, SAD 297/
3/34-9.
35 Wingate to Asser, 2 Aug. 1908, SAD 283/3/12-22;Wingate to Rees, 24Oct. 1908, SAD 284/1/49;
Daly, Empire on the Nile, p. 150.
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The racial categories which informed British understandings of the Sudan
played a particular role in driving violence.36 ‘Arabs ’, the British believed, were
prone to manipulation by religious leaders such as the Mahdi, but the prompt
suppression of such leaders would demonstrate to all who heard of it the om-
nipotence of the government. The people of the Nuba Mountains, however, were
‘blacks ’ not Arabs, and ‘ it is notorious that blacks place little credence in what they
hear, but are only convinced by seeing or feeling’.37
A wild and ignorant population such as that of southern Kordofan can only be impressed
with a sense of their comparative insigniﬁcance by a display of power and they should be
aﬀorded a tangible sign of the power of the Government to enforce its administration when
necessary … For this reason I consider an increase in the garrison of Southern Kordofan
necessary, and patrols in suﬃcient force to overawe the native mind.38
This view of racial diﬀerence was an enduring one ; forty years later another
administrator explained in a private letter that he would never consider launching
a ‘patrol ’ against Arabs, but that ‘Nuba are quite diﬀerent, dull-witted, without
sensibility, primitive, obstinate and only half-acquainted with Arabic, you can’t
manage them like Arabs … things can’t be done without the use – or show – of
force. ’39
British colonial violence, like that of the French, also grew partly from individual
ambition.40 In the early years of the Condominium British oﬃcers in the Sudan
were technically oﬃcers of the Egyptian army, on secondment from their British
regiments in search of adventure and decorations.41 There was a long waiting list
for service in the Egyptian army, which many sought to jump through personal
appeal toWingate.42Once there, they longed for the ‘ fun’ of action: oﬃcers wrote
privately to Wingate, pleading that their units should be allowed to join patrols ;
a patrol to the Nuba Mountains in 1910 was ‘ inundated with volunteers ’.43 Those
who had already secured their medals mocked their juniors, and deprecated the
ﬁnancial cost of violence. But despite concern that ‘bloodthirsty medal-hunters ’
launched unnecessary patrols, Wingate awarded Egyptian army promotions and
medals to those involved, and he used his personal contacts to seek British army
recognition of their service, to the point where complaints were raised by those
serving elsewhere in the empire : ‘The honors and rewards bestowed on the Army
36 For a useful summary of this categorization, see H. Sharkey, ‘Colonialism and the culture of
nationalism in the northern Sudan, 1898–1956’ (PhD thesis, Princeton, 1998), p. 39.
37 Lloyd, ‘Report on Kordofan province, 1908’, p. 55, SAD 283/9/40-68.
38 Kordofan province annual report, 1905, SAD 701/25/164-9.
39 Owen to Father, 20 Nov. 1944, SAD 414/15/74-5.
40 T.Weiskel, French colonial rule and the Baule peoples : resistance and collaboration, 1889–1911 (Oxford, 1980),
pp. 232–4. 41 Butler to Father, 10 June 1910, SAD 304/8/12-14.
42 Lewin toWingate, 23Aug. 1908,SAD283/5/67-8 ;Wingate toMurray, 7 July 1908,SAD283/1/15.
43 Lewin toWingate, 10 July 1908, SAD 283/1/53-5 ; Asser toWingate, 27Oct. 1908, SAD 284/1/53;
Lewin to Wingate, 10 July 1908, SAD 283/1/53-5; Butler to Father, 15 Oct. 1910, SAD 304/8/30-3 ;
Asser to Wingate, 12 Oct. 1910, SAD 298/1/35-9.
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in Egypt have caused heart burnings in India and elsewhere. ’44 During the First
World War British oﬃcers – presumably motivated by a powerful blend of guilt
and jealousy – were particularly desirous of a ‘a chance at being shot at ’. Wider
demands on resources limited patrols for most of the war, but the period from late
1917 to 1919 saw a ﬂurry of patrols, as soldiers experimented with new techniques
of warfare. Even the governor-general could play a part, coming to visit the troops
on the front line in imitation of the visits of George V to cheer up the Tommies.45
Overall, then, throughout the early decades of the Condominium, and when-
ever coercive resources could be found, local British administrators – inspectors,
up to 1920, and district commissioners (DCs) thereafter – sought to make their
availability as apparent as possible. It was this which drove the lurching, unpre-
dictable violence of the early colonial state. A touring inspector, or provincial
governor, with a column of soldiers and police, would summon local meks and their
people to a meeting with the evident aim of intimidating them.46 Those who had
oﬀered direct deﬁance to government – and who refused to come along to these
displays of government power47 – would be ‘visited ’ by a patrol, and adminis-
trators sought to make the impact of these patrols as dramatic as possible, through
simple destruction: ‘Finding no opposition we only burned the houses and killed
all the animals ’ wrote Savile, the governor, in passing comment on the daily work
of a patrol.48 Thus was the ‘power of the Government ’ manifested : ‘Only the
crudest actions will impress crude brains ’, observed one oﬃcer, in retrospective
justiﬁcation of the public display of the severed heads of the mek of Nyima and his
principal ally.49
I V
British oﬃcials saw the people of the Nuba Mountains – ‘ the Nuba’ – as an em-
battled remnant populace, hemmed in by the Arabicized nomads of the sur-
rounding plains.50 In the ﬁrst decades of Anglo-Egyptian rule, they believed that
the Condominium had brought relief from such raids, and that the people of
44 Ward, War Oﬃce to under secretary of state, Foreign Oﬃce, 3 Mar. 1902, PRO FO 78/5239;
Asser to Wingate, 12 Oct. 1910, SAD 298/1/35-9; Slatin to Wingate, 10 Dec. 1911, SAD 301/6/59-61.
For medal-seeking, see for example ‘Special Army Order’ of 20 Mar. 1909, SAD 701/25/317; Wingate
to General Wynne, 28 Sept. 1908, 283/9/35-6; Wingate to Asser, 23 Aug. 1908, SAD 283/5/50-5. Also
Balfour, ‘Fiki Ali ’, SAD 303/8/6-39. Wingate was not always successful. Lloyd, instigator of the 1908
patrol, never received the medal he had hoped for: Lloyd toWingate, 23 Sept. 1908, SAD 283/9/14-15;
Wingate to Lloyd, 30 Nov. 1910, SAD 701/25/333.
45 See for exampleWingate toDrake, 11 Aug. 1915, SAD196/2/93;Wingate toCromer, 21 June 1915,
SAD 195/4/197-8; SIR No. 281, Dec. 1917, PRO FO 371/3199; Smith, ‘Report on Patrol No. 32’,
pp. 5, 9, and 14, SAD 643/13/1-42 ; SIR No. 282, Jan. 1918, PRO FO 371/3199.
46 Savile, ‘Travels in Kordofan and Darfur’, 19 Jan. 1910, SAD 427/1/1-150.
47 Kordofan province annual report, 1904, SAD 701/25/159-63.
48 Savile, ‘Travels in Kordofan and Darfur’, 1 Feb. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150.
49 Extract from Lamb, ‘Operations against the Nuba Gebels ’, SAD 795/8/183-7. The display of the
heads was not mentioned in any oﬃcial report at the time.
50 Lloyd, ‘Report on Kordofan province, 1908, pp. 30–1, 54–5, SAD 283/9/40-68; GGR, 1908, p. 7.
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the mountains, ungratefully, had responded by increasing their own raids : com-
munities on diﬀerent hills raided one another ; and any or all of themmight raid the
plains people. Slaves and cattle were the prime objects of such raids : the slaves
being kept for work; or as wives ; or being traded on to other communities in
exchange for cattle and riﬂes.51 Oﬃcials were not sure whether ‘ the Nuba’ – who
spoke a variety of languages, many of them unrelated and not intercom-
prehensible – were a ‘ tribe ’ or a ‘race ’.52 But they were sure that these ‘Negro
aborigines ’ were an ancient, remnant populace, where kings were helpless before
priests : ‘One has only to remember how Agag was slaughtered by Samuel after
being spared by Saul. ’53 In seeking to identify local rulers who could end such
raiding – the men to whom the power of the government should be shown –
oﬃcials decided that authority rested on the powers of ‘Arro’, or spirit, in each
mountain and that it was the representative of this spirit (a ﬁgure for whom the
British used the catch-all term ‘kujur ’, widely used across the Sudan for non-
Islamic ritual ﬁgures whom the British believed to be a dangerous threat to
authority) who wielded real power.54 Even where there was a secular ﬁgure of
authority as well, ‘public life is ultimately in the hands of the rainmaker’.55 The
implication for administrators was clear enough: it was the kujurs who had to
be shown the power of government, for all lived in fear of them.
In the 1920s oﬃcials began to present kujurs rather diﬀerently. From being the
‘natural enemies of Government ’, who could only be overawed, and whose in-
ﬂuence must ultimately be reduced by the administration, they became potentially
desirable allies, and by the 1930s, Vicars-Miles could conﬁdently insist that kujurs
were neither ‘witch doctors ’ nor ‘despots ’.56 The patrols had been the result
not of the deliberate resistance of these men, but of their reluctance to come
51 J. W. Sagar, ‘Notes on the history, religion and customs of the Nubas’, pp. 140–2, SNR, 5 (1922),
pp. 137–56; Kordofan province annual reports, 1904 and 1905, SAD 701/25/159-69.
52 C. Seligman, Pagan tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (London 1932) ; Sagar, ‘Notes on the history’, pp. 137–9;
D. Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper of southern Kordofan’, SNR, 15 (1932), 159–99. More recent
scholarship has emphasized diversity, and sought (not always successfully!) to avoid ‘ the Nuba’ as a
term: Stevenson,The Nuba people. Linguistic heterogeneity of the populace has long been acknowledged:
Seligman, Pagan tribes, p. 370.
53 Seligman, Pagan tribes, p. 366: the section on the Nuba Mountains was based on work in 1910–11;
Lloyd, ‘Report on Kordofan province, 1908’, p. 57, SAD 283/9/40-68. For those who wish to pursue
the reference, it is to I Samuel 15.
54 Sagar ‘Notes on the history’, pp. 144–6; S. Nadel, ‘A shaman cult in theNubaMountains’, p. 85n,
SNR, 24 (1941), pp. 85–112, denounces the inappropriateness of the term kujur for the Nuba Mountains.
For the British use of the term kujur to identify what they saw as illegitimate and threatening ritual
power, see D. Johnson, Nuer prophets : a history of prophecy from the Upper Nile in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries (Oxford, 1994), pp. 6, 24–5.
55 Seligman, Pagan tribes, pp. 375 and 379; Sagar, ‘Notes on the history’, p. 156.
56 Compare Lloyd, ‘Report on Kordofan province, 1908’, p. 56, SAD 283/9/40-68; Sagar, ‘Notes
on the history’ ; and Gillan, Some aspects, pp. 13–14. Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’,
pp. 29–30, SAD 631/10/1-64. There are obvious comparisons to be drawn with British policy among
the Nuer of Sudan, where a similar rehabilitation of kujurs was interrupted by the antipathetic attitude
of one particular provincial governor: D. H. Johnson, ‘Editor’s introduction’, p. 17, in C. A. Willis,
The Upper Nile province handbook : a report on peoples and government in the southern Sudan, 1931 (Oxford, 1995).
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forward: ‘ the real headman, hiding in his cave, did not know the Government’s
policy ’. But by the time Vicars-Miles wrote they had been ‘won over ’; and their
authority, based on the ‘rigorous observance of ancient traditions ’, was being used
in support of the government.57
This oﬃcial rehabilitation of the kujurs accorded well with the enthusiasm for
‘ indirect rule ’ and tradition which gripped British administrators in the Sudan in
the 1920s, as a result both of the wider colonial vogue for Lugard’s theories and
of the more local impact of the revolts and unrest in Egypt and Khartoum from
1919 to 1924. This was, as Ranger has noted of British Africa widely, a period in
which administrators had ‘come to dislike the consequences of the changes which
had taken place ’; rueing the carelessness which had permitted political inno-
vation, they set themselves ever more ﬁrmly against it.58 The arrival of a new
governor-general in 1927, with an extravagant rhetoric of traditional authority
as a hygienic barrier against the ‘germs’ of political discontent, gave additional
impetus.59 The rhetoric was taken up with enthusiasm by Angus Gillan, a long-
serving administrator who was deputy governor and then governor of the pro-
vince. Other changes created a need for a new policy : the Egyptian military
presence in Sudan ended in 1924, and by 1926 the new ‘SudanDefence Force ’ was
a modest 8,000 strong and the inﬂuence of the army in administration had greatly
declined.60
Gillan had already concluded that the problem in theNubaMountains generally
was that many recognized meks were ‘powerless ’ and that the real need was for the
‘regeneration of tribal authority ’: simply showing meks the power of the govern-
ment, was not enough – they had to be made part of that power.61 This, in Gillan’s
eyes, was the only alternative to endless, and ultimately unaﬀordable, patrols :
‘Nuba wars have cost the Government much in money and something in lives.
A prosperous and contented Nuba civilisation will not only cost less but will be a
direct asset to the country. ’62
The new aim of policy was deﬁned as a ‘Nuba renaissance’, and its proponents
argued in vivid language for a cultural and racial separation between Nuba and
Arab: ‘ I should like to lay stress on the undesirability of an Arab–Nuba
blend … The result is always an undisciplined, drunken, half-caste Arab who has
no background and no tradition to keep him up to the mark. ’63 The romance of
nakedness encouraged colonial imaginings of Nuba essentialism: ‘So wild and
attractive ’, murmured one oﬃcial’s wife ; while an assistant district commissioner
57 Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’, pp. 41–2, SAD 631/10/1-64.
58 Ranger, ‘The invention of tradition’, p. 247.
59 GGR, 1921, pp. 4–6; Daly, Empire on the Nile, pp. 360–79; ‘Devolution in native administration’,
memorandum with civil sec. to governor, 25 Jan. 1927, SAD 723/5/34-9.
60 Daly, Empire on the Nile, p. 322.
61 Gillan, ag. governor to civil sec., 24 May 1925, SAD 723/5/10; ‘Devolution in native adminis-
tration’, 8 Mar. 1927, SAD 723/6/15-22. 62 Gillan, Some aspects of Nuba administration, pp. 56–7.
63 Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’, p. 33, SAD 631/10/1-64.
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(ADC) pertly noted that ‘our female visitors [were] delighted with the nakedness of
the people’.64
But the practicalities of administration subverted the commitment to idealized
tradition. Vehement though this rhetoric of essentialism and purity was on the
dangers of the ‘miserable, decadent, semi-arabicised Nuba’,65 British oﬃcials
simply could not impose ‘purity ’ and also maintain administration: the chronic
ﬁnancial problems of the early 1930s forced the administration to concentrate on
revenue and the promotion of trade, and the governor who succeeded Gillan
announced that ‘we cannot deny progress to the Nuba’. The mountains had
been declared a ‘closed district ’ in 1924, but the administration had conceded
that Arab residents of Kordofan could not be excluded as ‘outsiders ’.66 The dis-
trict administration anyway lacked the means to police exclusion, and numerous
Muslim religious specialists, petty traders and artisans entered the hills – including,
by 1933, an estimated 1,000 West African migrants, working and trading on their
slow journey toMecca.67 Florid pronouncements on protecting the Nuba gave way
to concern over markets, and from 1934 a conference on trade and development
became a major annual ritual of the provincial administration.68 Christian
missionaries, who had been encouraged to undertake educational work in the
mountains as a counter to the inﬂuence of Muslim clerks, were appalled by the
oﬃcial decision to use Arabic, in Arabic script, as the basis of education. By 1942
they were denouncing the administration for promoting ‘Arabic culture ’.69 Even
attitudes to nudity were ambivalent : ‘Surely such people must be very close to the
apes ’, commented the same ADC who had noted its thrilling eﬀect on visitors.70
The racial separation of the ‘Nuba renaissance’ was, then, a brief phase : so brief
that it seems unlikely to have had the drastic consequences that have been argued
of it.71 The real signiﬁcance of the policy was rather that, in encouraging a shift
away from reliance on large-scale ‘patrol ’ violence, it made space for the
64 Bell to Mother and Father, 24 Feb. 1934, SAD 697/11/48-50.
65 Gillan, Some aspects of Nuba administration, p. 12.
66 K. Henderson, The making of the modern Sudan: the life and letters of Sir Douglas Newbold, KBE (Westport,
CT, 1974 (ﬁrst publ. 1953)), pp. 59, 66–7, 495; ‘Language teaching in Nuba schools ’ : memo of meeting
of 7 Dec. 1935, in Church Missionary Society (CMS) archives, Nuba Mountains, sub-ﬁles 3–6;
Gillan, dep. governor NMP to civil sec., 25 Feb. 1927, SAD 723/5/46-7; Ibrahim, The dilemma of British
rule, p. 43. There were, apparently, continued eﬀorts to remove Arabs settled on certain mountains :
Owen to Father, 12 Nov. 1939, SAD 414/10/6-8.
67 Sudan Monthly Report, No. 58, Oct.–Nov. 1933, SAD SudA+PK1543. For the presence and
licensing of traders in various parts of the Nuba Mountains, see Bell, diary, 9 Mar. 1934, 22 Aug. 1934,
25 Sept. 1934, SAD 698/7/23, 78 and 90; also Nadel, The Nuba, p. 74, who recorded a number of
government-approved ‘markets ’ with Arab shops. Newbold, governor to Bertram, CMS, 3 Aug. 1935,
CMS Nuba Mountains, sub-ﬁles 3–6.
68 Foley to ‘Darling Mummy’, 22 Feb. 1934, SAD 784/8/14-16; Owen to Mother, 26 Feb. 1940,
SAD 414/11/25-8.
69 Ibrahim, Dilemma of British rule, pp. 75, 77–8, sees the language decision as the deﬁnitive aban-
donment of the ‘Nuba renaissance’ ; Martin to Hooper, 26 Mar. 1942, CMS Nuba Mountains, sub-
ﬁles 3–6. 70 Bell to Mother and Father, 20 Oct. 1934, SAD 697/12/56-7.
71 Kamal Osman Salih, ‘British policy and the accentuation of inter-ethnic divisions’.
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emergence of a new focus of authority : a system of formally recognized courts, very
similar to those being established elsewhere in the Sudan at the same time.72 The
signiﬁcance of this can only be understood in the context of a complex competition
for authority within the communities of the Nuba Mountains, which can be
exempliﬁed in the Nyima hills.
V
Ethnographic work since the 1940s has amply demonstrated that the notion of a
single Nuba identity and culture is unsafe. As Baumann has suggested, the main
thing shared by the populace of the mountains in the early twentieth century was
that they were all – in diverse ways – culturally very diﬀerent from the Arabic-
speaking plains people.73 In seeking to reach behind the vision of the all-powerful
kujur (which was presumably the result of extrapolating observations made in the
area around the administrative centre of Dilling)74 Nadel’s detailed ethnographic
research in the 1930s, and the writings of Anglican missionaries (who spent much
longer in the area than did Nadel), oﬀer valuable material, and suggest that
authority was contested, and appeared in many forms.
Within homesteads in Nyima, married men claimed authority over the labour
and reproductive power of wives and daughters, and the labour of sons ; and they
claimed control of livestock and, to a large degree, of the crops. Women had
some authority over crops, and a degree of authority over the labour of their
daughters. Potentially challenging these claims were those of patrilineal clanship,
which gave a degree of authority to more distant kin. There was a degree of
competition between married men, who resented the claims of aﬃnes, or lineage
elders, on the resources of their households ; accumulation was diﬃcult in the face
of a constant expectation of redistributive generosity. There also existed wider
claims to authority, going beyond kinship or aﬃnal ties, in which ideas of power
bestowed by a Divinity, or by spirits was central.75 Generational tensions played
some part, notably through theNyima age-grade organization for youngmen.This
evidently changed considerably in the early decades of the twentieth century :
confusions in Nadel’s account, and disagreements between his observations and
those of the missionaries presumably reﬂect the diﬃculties – for Nyimang, and for
academic observers – of trying to reconstruct a system which (as will be suggested)
had been shattered by the events of 1917–18.76
72 See for example D. Johnson, ‘Judicial regulation and administrative control : customary law and
the Nuer, 1898–1954’, Journal of African History, 27 (1986), pp. 59–78.
73 See for example Stevenson, The Nuba people, pp. 6–15; G. Baumann, National integration and local
integrity : the Miri of the Nuba Mountains in the Sudan (Oxford, 1987), pp. 9, 31–58.
74 According to Nadel there really was a ‘Great Kujur’ in Dilling, though nowhere else : The Nuba,
pp. 420–1, 441.
75 R. Stevenson, ‘TheNyamangof the southernKordofanhills ’, 1940, pp. 4–5, 7, SAD795/8/161-82.
Stevenson, The Nuba people, pp. 89, 97, 113–16; Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 46–53, 65–8, 379–93.
76 Nadel’s account is inconsistent in its explanation of when exactly circumcision took place: compare
Nadel,The Nuba, pp. 406–7 with 409; there are a number of major diﬀerences with Stevenson’s account,
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These sources agree, however, that there were multiple notions of wider ritual
power. This was patrilineally inherited in the case of the rain-maker (who claimed
rain-making power for the whole of Nyima) and obtained through non-inherited
and unpredictable possession in the case of ‘hill-spirits ’ and some human spirits.77
The powers given by such spirits might be speciﬁc to a certain disease, but usually
they involved an ability to aﬀect the health and fertility of wider groups – either a
‘hill ’, or even a wider population across the hills. Performance of particular rituals
for fertility or against disease oﬀered a public opportunity for the manifestation
of a claim to such power. But it was the events associated with the movement of
men through the age-grade system which had apparently become, certainly by
the early twentieth century, spectacles in which spirit-priests of all kinds – who
may themselves in some cases have been quite young men – sought to claim
power, and assert authority, over a constituency of young men rising through
the grades : circumcision itself was said to have been introduced to Nyima by a
spirit-priest. Nadel’s largely retrospective account of the age-grades emphasized
the role of spirit-priests and/or the rain-maker in a series of events – the ‘water
holes ’ ceremony, circumcision, the ‘beating of the bulls ’, the ‘beer drinking’. Only
at the end of the cycle were young men released from obligation to these leaders.78
It was at this point that they would be expected to have married, and to establish
their own home – whether through their own endeavours to accumulate, or
through the assistance of their father or some other patron.
Raiding could play a major part in such accumulation : some spirit-priests
served as prophets who advised young men on the conduct of raids against other
communities, and had a claim on the spoils – livestock and people – from any raid
they organized. Retrospective accounts suggested a system which deﬁned the
inﬂuence of the various spirit-priests in a ‘hierarchy of allegiances ’, but there are
clear signs of competition, between diﬀerent spirit-priests, and between these
ﬁgures and rain-makers. Accumulation in the mountains was, Nadel suggested,
limited by its own aims; the conspicuous consumption of wealth in displays of
generosity was the ideal, and this constantly redistributed wealth. But these leaders
pursued more persistent trajectories of accumulation, in which generosity with
cattle or grain attracted youngmenwhose service in raiding brought in newwealth,
and allowed further human investment through the purchase of slaves.79
Such accumulation ﬁtted easily into the combination of trading and raiding
which characterized relations between the mountain communities and the people
for example as to whether the kwei kanyar (kokanyar, in Nadel’s version) are initiates or initiands, andmore
importantly on the timing and role of the ‘beating of the bulls ’ and the ‘beer-drinking’ events :
Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang’, pp. 13–17, SAD 795/8/161-82.
77 Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 443–5; Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang’, p. 3, SAD 795/8/161-82; Stevenson,
The Nuba people, pp. 113–16.
78 Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’, pp. 173–4; Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 406–12; Stevenson, The Nuba
people, pp. 100–3.
79 Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 65–7, 163, 346, 393, 408, 412–13, 452; Stevenson, The Nuba people, p. 99;
Sagar, ‘Notes on the history’, p. 156.
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of the surrounding plains. There was here much of the sort of interaction across
ethnic boundaries (and these were ethnic as much as racial boundaries – the
‘Arabs ’ of the plains included many relatively recently Arabicized and incor-
porated individuals) which has been so well described for the Rift Valley of East
Africa.80 The populace of the mountains produced grain, honey, tamarind, and
slaves for trade ; they sought cattle – as a store of wealth, and as brideprice – and
salt from the plains, and they sought also to obtain ﬁrearms, for hunting
and for raiding. There was a high degree of tension and violence across this
boundary, which increased at certain times – from 1886 to 1887, and again from
1896 to 1898 – but which always accompanied trade; the presence in the Nuba
Mountains of thousands of riﬂes, largely booty captured by the Mahdists from
the crumbling Turco-Egyptian state, provides evidence of that.81
In some cases trade may have provided a route to accumulation without
raiding.82 But more widely, the linkage between organizing violence and organ-
izing trade was a direct one; and here as elsewhere in Africa those who played both
roles became ‘gatekeepers ’, who marked their privileged access to the world
beyond the mountains through dress – ‘until quite recent times, any stranger who
appeared wearing a tagia [cap] was regarded as a ‘‘ sultan’’ ’.83 In the 1880s a
missionary described a local ‘khojur ’ in Dilling, neighbouring Nyima, and his
enthusiasm for seeking external alliance:
Kakum was at that time a man of about ﬁfty years of age of commanding appearance, and
greatly respected by the blacks. He used to wear wide white trousers and a gallabieh, and on
his head a nicely embroidered cap with a large tassel which our sisters had made for him.
He had passed his youth in Alexandria as a soldier, and acquitted himself admirably as the
Khojur, not of Delen only, but also of the neighbouring hills. Numbers of people used to
come and seek his blessing and advice, and when our Bishop Comboni visited El Obeid
he was there to beg him to send missionaries to teach his people and make men of them.84
When the British appeared – initially, as distributors of weapons which were to
be used against the remnants of the Mahdists – it was these men who oﬀered
themselves as meks, seeing in this the possibility for access to new resources.85 ‘Mek
Kujur is the chief of them all, and seems an intelligent man and loyal to
the government ’, reported one of the ﬁrst British oﬃcers to visit Jebel Ghulfan
80 T. Spear, ‘ Introduction’, pp. 1–18, in T. Spear andR.Waller, eds.,BeingMaasai : ethnicity and identity
in East Africa (London, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and Athens, OH, 1993).
81 Stevenson,The Nuba people, pp. 31–56, oﬀers a survey of sources on the NubaMountains before the
Mahdiyya; see also ibid., pp. 57–60; Sagar, ‘Notes on the history’ ; Ahmed Uthman Muhammad
Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule in the Nuba Mountains (Khartoum, 1985), p. 48.
82 Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 310–11.
83 Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’, p. 170. ‘Gatekeepers ’ is a term borrowed from J. Lonsdale,
‘The conquest state of Kenya, 1895–1905’, in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy valley, pp. 13–44; see also
J. Glassman, Feasts and riot : revelry, rebellion and popular consciousness on the Swahili coast (Portsmouth, NH,
and London, 1995), pp. 47–54.
84 J. Ohrwalder, Ten years’ captivity in the Mahdi’s camp, 1882–1892 (London, 1892), p. 24.
85 Report by Kaimakam Butler, App. A2, SIR No. 83, June 1901, PRO FO 78/5167; Seligman,
Pagan tribes, p. 376; Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’.
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(another hill neighbouring the Nyima range) unconsciously summarizing this in-
dividual’s multiple claims to authority : ritual leader, organizer of trade and viol-
ence, and intermediary with the world beyond the mountains. Maintaining the
markers of their distinction, British oﬃcials gave men like ‘Mek Kujur ’ cloth to
wear.86
Once recognized as meks, these individuals found that the basis of their authority
was inadequate to the British expectations that they would pay tribute and end
raids on other communities ; and complaints by administrators recurred constantly
to the failure of meks to stop raiding by young men.87 The trajectory of violence in
Nyima exempliﬁes the dilemma of the meks. Agabna was the son of Arowga, one of
the hereditary line of shirra, or rain-makers, in the area. Arowga – or perhaps some
competing accumulator – had already ensured that the people of Nyima had a
reputation as raiders by 1902. In 1906 an oﬃcer leading a patrol of two companies
had decided not to try conclusions with the people of Nyima; and hadmet Arowga
and decided that despite Arowga’s claim to authority over the whole of Nyima, he
had no inﬂuence beyond his hill ; it was shortly after this that Agabna claimed
the same authority, and was given a gun – the symptomatic gift of recognition from
a coercive state.88 Agabna was then implicated in various raids, though reports
reaching the British suggested that he had less inﬂuence in organizing these than a
kujur called Dargol. Another kujur, Kilkun, captured in the 1908 patrol, oﬀered a
description of the genesis of one of these raids. It was planned by Irshin, another of
Arowga’s sons ; he had invitedKilkun to take part, as Kilkun’s spirit was believed to
oﬀer good guidance. When Kilkun joined in sixteen men from his hill, Kurmetti,
followed him; this in itself was a success for Kilkun, who was in competition
with another kujur, Firoun, on the same hill.89 Some two dozenmen had also joined
the raid from other hills. Agabna initially shunned involvement, but changed his
mind when he saw that all the ‘ﬁghting men’ from his hill were going to take part.
Kilkun and his followers shared seven cattle captured in the raid – out of a total
booty of ten cattle and three people. These were particularly useful to Kilkun since
he had recently been taken hostage while ‘visiting ’ another hill, and had had to pay
nine cattle to secure his freedom.90 The picture that emerges here is of rival
86 Appendix, SIR No. 83, June 1901, PRO FO 78/5167; Wheatley, diary, 14 Feb. 1912, SAD 703/3/
1-65; Savile, ‘Travels in Kordofan and Darfur ’, 27 Jan. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150.
87 ‘Draft Kordofan annual report, 1908’, SAD 701/25/191;Wheatley, diary, 10 Feb. 1912, SAD 703/
3/1-65; see also ‘Operational order No. 2’ with Smith, ‘Report on Patrol No. 32’, SAD 643/13/1-47.
88 For the shirra, rain-maker, see Stevenson, The Nuba people, p. 117, and Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 452–3;
extract from a report by Major O’Connell, quoted in GGR, 1902, p. 50; Kordofan annual report, 1906,
SAD 701/25/170-9; Lloyd, ‘Notes on jebel Nyima’, SAD 701/25/235-9.
89 Lloyd to civil sec., 10 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/251-2; ‘Statement of kujur Kilkun’, 18 Nov. 1908,
SAD 701/25/303-4. Ferounwas photographed in 1900 (SADA35/42), and he appeared on a list of kujurs
in 1908: Lloyd, ‘Notes on jebel Nyima’, SAD 701/25/235-9.
90 For Agabna’s claim to the mekship, see Lloyd, ‘Notes on jebel Nyima’, SAD 701/25/235-9; for the
spoils of the raid, see the extract from the report of the inspector, Kordofan, in GGR, 1907, p. 6 ;
‘Statement of kujur Kilkun’, 18 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/303-4. Kilkun was the kujur who was hanged
with Agabna in 1918.
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claimants to authority, each possessed of some ritual role and with a handful of
followers, who relied on raids and the loot from these to sustain their followings of
young men: even those who occasionally co-operated in raids still competed for
followers. Most of the many claimants to authority across the Nuba Mountains
operated on a similarly small scale : a report in 1908 listed more than 300 meks and
kujurs, most of whom claimed a score or two of ‘riﬂes ’.91
For a little while, some meks were able to continue their role as dual organizers of
violence and organizers of trade. They supplied grain to British administrators, and
they were always ready to provide ‘ friendlies ’ in support of British patrols against
other mountain communities, for which oﬃcers were appropriately grateful (while
deprecating the tendency of the ‘ friendlies ’ to ‘ loot a pig and belt home at once’).92
But to prevent petty raids by their young men, or even worse, to hand over raiders
for punishment outside the community, would destroy themeks’ inﬂuence, and they
readily reported their conﬂicts with young men on this : ‘young men … objected
to the arrangement made with the Governor, to apprehend thieves and send them
in to Government ’.93 Confronted with accusations of harbouring thieves and
murderers, meks sometimes challenged British oﬃcials to demonstrate their own
ability to assert authority against younger men who ‘ in the most obstinate manner
possible, refused to comply with the Government demands’. ‘They complained
they were unable to restrain their young men and asked me to speak to them. ’94
The encounters between meks and touring administrators, which provided the
principle public space for the enactment of the relationships of colonial authority
in the period up to the mid-1920s, reﬂected the tensions of the relationship. When
in 1914 British oﬃcials tried to persuade Mek Nimr of Jebel Mandal to accede to
their demands, ‘many of the young Nubas gathered round’ and negotiations
foundered.95 At such meetings, meks and administrators each paraded their armed
followings, as the back drop to a process of negotiation in which administrators
sought to extract tribute and the surrender of fugitives, and meks sought to con-
ﬁrm their role as intermediaries but avoid being forced into disciplining their
followings. Agabna was eventually unable to sustain this balancing act.
Agabnawas seized in advance of the 1908 patrol and led around, bound, with the
troops ; the real aim of the patrol was Dargol.When it proved impossible to capture
Dargol or force his surrender, the patrol contented itself with destroying crops
and houses. This was apparently suﬃcient to undermine Dargol’s reputation; in
the wake of the raid the people of Sultan – the followers of Arowga, or Agabna, or
his brother Irshin – evidently expected to regain their local pre-eminence. Agabna
was subsequently implicated in more raids, and was arrested and brieﬂy sent to
Omdurman. Allowed to return to the provincial capital, El Obeid, he escaped and
91 Lloyd, ‘Report on Kordofan province, 1908’, SAD 283/9/40-68.
92 Lloyd to civil sec., 14 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/267-8; SIR No. 307, Feb. 1920, PROWO 33/997;
Lloyd to civil sec., 23 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/284-91.
93 SIR No. 215, June 1912, PRO WO 106/6225.
94 SIR No. 236, Mar. 1914, PRO WO 106/6225; Wheatley, diary, 10 Feb. 1912, SAD 703/3/1-65.
95 SIR No. 236, Mar. 1914, PRO WO 106/6225.
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made his way back to Nyima, where he organized raids with such success that he
accumulated dozens of slaves and a following of men with riﬂes, ﬁfty of whom
also had horses.96 It was his refusal to end raiding, or to surrender men wanted
for raiding, that led to Patrol No. 32. Agabna’s ﬁnal surrender followed the
intervention of another local kujur, Nimr, who persuaded some of Agabna’s
followers to desert, and so convinced Agabna that resistance was futile ; his
reward was a ‘robe of honour’ and £E100.97
Unsurprisingly, Agabna’s judicial murder, and this further demonstration of
‘ the power of the Government ’, did not in itself make meks any more able to fulﬁl
the demands of administrators – though it revealed clearly enough the penalties
for failing to do so. There were no further large-scale patrols in Nyima (though
there were in neighbouring hills, where men wanted for raids continued to ﬁnd
refuge) ;98 but the real transformation in authority did not come until the early
1930s, when a process began which was to turn one of several meks recognized in
Nyima into the ‘paramount ’ for the whole Nyima range, with a new focus of
authority.
V I
The introduction of courts in the Nuba Mountains followed wider policy in the
Condominium.99 Lesser headmen, designated sheikhs, were given minor courts
able to issue ﬁnes ; courts of meks sitting ‘ in council ’ with sheikhs and selected older
men had the authority to judge more important cases ; and wider courts com-
posed of several meks sitting together could hear cases from several communities.
This would remove the district administration from involvement in all but the
most serious cases.100
Gillan, architect of the ‘Nuba renaissance ’, insisted that this court system would
revive ‘ tribal authority ’, but his courts were entirely remote from former local
practice (or, as he would put it, ‘authentic Nuba culture ’), which was as polycentric
in the settlement of disputes as in everything else. Household, lineage, and com-
munity had been involved in dispute resolution ; some individuals with possessory
96 Lloyd to civil sec., 10 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/251-2; Lloyd toWingate, 5 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/
247-8; report byMr Sagar, 20Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/295-301; SIRNo. 270, Jan. 1917, PROWO106/
6225; Nadel, The Nuba, p. 393; Stevenson, The Nuba people, pp. 115–16, describes possessory spirits
in Nyima; see also Nadel, ‘A shaman cult ’ ; Savile, ‘Travels in Kordofan and Darfur ’, 19 Jan. 1910,
SAD 427/7/1-150; SIR, No. 303, Apr. 1917, PRO WO 106/6225. Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule,
p. 20, attributes Agabna’s imprisonment to the kidnapping of a woman.
97 Smith, ‘Report on Patrol No. 32’, p. 18, SAD 643/13/1-42; Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule,
p. 22 ; Nadel, The Nuba, p. 453.
98 SIRNo. 296, Mar. 1919, PROWO 33/997; SIR No. 309, Apr. 1920, PROWO 33/997; Gillan to
civil sec., 24 May 1925, SAD 723/5/10.
99 Gillan to all DCs, Nuba Mountains province, 17 July 1926, SAD 723/4/19-47; for discussion
of the same processes among the Nuer, see Johnson, ‘Judicial regulation and administrative control ’.
100 Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule, pp. 36–7; Gillan, ‘Devolution and native administration in
Nuba Mountains province’, 8 Mar. 1927, SAD 723/6/15-22.
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spirits had acted, in eﬀect, to judge cases brought to them; disputes with other
communities had been settled either by violence or sometimes by the mediation
of a gatekeeper.101 Though oﬃcials were ingenious in their arguments as to the
‘ traditional ’ nature of the conciliar courts they created, these actually represented
a drastic change, both in their assertion of a unique right to judge within the
community and in their ability to spanmore than community, so that thefts or raids
committed by the young men of one hill against the people of another could now
be heard in these courts, in front of the assembledmeks of several hills.102The courts
relied on, and provided a framework for, a distinct cross-community stratum of
meks, sheikhs and the older men who sat ‘ in council ’, with a shared interest in
upholding the law and order underwritten by the government. Across the Nuba
Mountains, a determined policy of court amalgamation and federation steadily
reduced the number of meks during the 1930s, and further bound those who
remained together in co-operation.103
In Nyima, a combined court was created in 1931, under Mek Amina Derdimma
(whose name is also recorded as Dardimi and Dardimalla), the son of one of sev-
eral men who had formerly competed for authority as kujurs on Salara hill. He
combined his mekship with a steady building up of his own household resources,
and he had eight wives in 1939, and more than ﬁfteen in 1947. The jurisdiction of
his court expanded geographically with the creation of the ‘Nyamang Confed-
eration’ in 1939, so that he became in eﬀect the ‘Paramount ’ mek of Nyima. It also
grew socially, moving steadily into more and more aspects of domestic accumu-
lation : inheritance, adultery, bridewealth, theft, and compensation.104 This was
partly because of the growing demands of the state (so that Amina found him-
self involved in disputes over which parent should decide whether a girl could go
to school), but presumably also reﬂected the desire of men like himself to ﬁnd
aﬃrmation of their claims on the property and bodies of others.105 Courts here, as
elsewhere in Africa, provided a focus for an authority based on accommodation
between male household heads and colonial administrators.106 A change in the tax
101 Gillan, ‘Devolution and native administration in Nuba Mountains province’, 8 Mar. 1927, SAD
723/6/15-22; Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 127, 246–7, 250, 459; Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang of the southern
Kordofan hills ’, p. 21, SAD 795/8/161-82.
102 Gillan, Some aspects, pp. 15–18; Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’, p. 195.
103 Bell, diary, 13 July 1934, SAD698/7/61; Bell to ‘Mother andDad’, 14Dec. 1934 and 15Mar. 1935,
SAD 697/13/8-10 and 45-6.
104 Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule, p. 22; Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 113, 127–8, 255, 315, 402, 453, 472;
Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour B, 19 Nov. 1947, SAD G//S 1121; Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang of the
southern Kordofan hills ’, SAD 795/8/161-82; Bell, diary, 18 Dec. 1934, SAD 698/7/131; Bell to
‘Mother andDad’, 14 Nov. 1934, SAD 697/12/69-71 ; Owen to Father, 3 Sept. 1940, SAD 414/11/82-4;
Owen to Mother, 7 Dec. 1941, SAD 414/12/64-5 ; by 1933, the (incomplete) oﬃcial statistics suggested
that Nuba courts handled 1,200 criminal and 500 civil cases in a year : GGR, 1933, p. 128.
105 Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour B, 18 July 1948, SADG//S 1121; ‘Salara local administration’, 31
Jan. 1939, SAD 795/8/122-4 ; ‘Native administration in Kordofan’, 11 Nov. 1938, SAD 795/8/117-26;
Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour C, 8 Oct. 1950 SAD G//S 1121. Amina was in the 1930s seeking the
support of the government anthropologist to further expand the jurisdiction of his court : Nadel,
The Nuba, p. 491. 106 Iliﬀe, Africans, pp. 198–9.
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system, introduced steadily throughout the hills from the late 1920s, complemented
the creation of courts. A poll tax replaced the former collective tribute, and now
individualmen could be held responsible for tax default and ﬁned by the court, with
the result that their property could be seized and sold to wealthier neighbours.
By 1942, the court was clearly established in themountains as the locus of authority ;
in one case, rivals for a mekship fought for physical control of the court-house
itself.107
The courts – and the meks and men who sat in them – had a new coercive force
to uphold their decision: the ‘chiefs’ police ’. It is not clear howmany of these there
were : Gillan’s initial plans were for a force of only a few dozen, but he also
insisted that these police should be employed and paid directly by the meks and
sheikhs, and that ‘nor does it matter much to us, for instance, in the case of a Sheikh
who is allocated two police at 75 PT [piastres] if he actually appoints three at
50 PT’; in 1933 one mek was able to supply an escort of half a dozen men from his
‘bodyguard’.108The physical trappings of the post – a uniform in some hills, metal
badges in others, the key to the ‘ lock-up’ in which the mek detained the deﬁant –
marked their authority as derived from association with the government.109
As a spectacle, the court stressed order, deference to age, and the association of a
stratum of elder men with external forms and markers of authority. Photographs
show meks, sheikhs, and advisers in the white gowns and turbans of Arabicized
riverain culture. Nadel described an ‘ impressive court-house ’ elsewhere in the
mountains, with its dais and benches and guard of police, and he wrote of
Amina’s Nyima court at greater length.110
Chiefs and elders sit around the walls of the court-house, the presiding chiefs on chairs, the
rest on angarebs [rope and wood beds] or on mats on the ﬂoor. Litigants and witnesses are
made towait outside till they are summoned into the presence of the court. They are led in by
tribal police, having left their weapons, sticks and sandals at the door … theymust stand at a
respectful distance from the chiefs. The discussion is calm and digniﬁed.111
Dress and behaviour around Amina’s court and oﬃce at Salara evoked not Nuba
essentialism but the routine culture of petty authority typical of the wider colonial
state in northern Sudan: a European visitor in 1945 found here no ‘picturesque’
nudity, but rather ‘a sort of Government oﬃce, a very small room and a larger one
with a dais in it ’; those around were ‘ordinarymen dressed in the long white cotton
clothes that the Sudanese usually wear ’. It was a dress code which may also hint at
the presence around Amina – who prided himself on his knowledge of Islam – of
107 Bell to ‘Mother and Dad’, 12 Mar. 1934, SAD 697/11/55-9; Owen to Mother, 26–7 Sept. 1942,
SAD 414/13/45-6.
108 Gillan, ‘Devolution and native administration in NubaMountains province’, 29 Feb. 1928, SAD
723/6/24-41. The mek of Otoro, in the eastern part of the mountains, had four police in 1933, at 50 PT:
Henderson, Making of the modern Sudan, p. 47.
109 Bell to ‘Mother and Dad’, 2 Oct. 1933, SAD 697/10/55-6; photograph at SAD A74/139; Rachel
Hassan, Journal, Tour C, 22 Aug. 1950, SAD G//S 1121.
110 Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 312, 403n. 111 Ibid., p. 472.
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the growing body of itinerant Muslim traders and holy men who tended to attach
themselves to meks, across the mountains.112
Three factors encouraged – indeed, made possible – the success of this trans-
formation from the spectacular violence of the patrol to the ordinary routine of the
court. One was the widespread experience of military service among a generation
of men; another was the availability of new paths to accumulation, which changed
former patterns of generational conﬂict and co-operation ; the third was the ef-
fective collapse of the public events through which ritual authority had beenmade.
In Nyima, this last factor was of especial importance. The 1917–18 patrol, and
the removal of young men, had irreversibly changed the public spectacle of age-
grade events. The initiation which should have taken place in 1918 never hap-
pened; there were over the next two decades a series of delayed and disjointed
rituals, but the very confusion in descriptions of these in the 1930s suggests how far
practice, and memory, had become uncertain. Spirit-priests and rain-makers
sought to revive these rituals under their control ; young men, many of whom were
now circumcized individually before setting oﬀ to ﬁnd work outside Nyima, were
pressured to take part in such rituals on their return. But the ceremonies became
more and more erratic and infrequent – and were increasingly disapproved of
by meks.113 Other ritual events in which spirit-priests were involved – cyclical
agricultural rites, and special ceremonies for health – continued, but in these
the spirit-priests faced more directly the competition of lineage spirits, and of
oﬀerings by individual household heads.114
The court usurped the role of the age-grade rituals as public events in which
authority was made. It was the seizure of youngmen for military service which had
disrupted the former cycle of public age rituals ; and it was this seizure too which
was to produce a generation of men who were willing and able to seize on the
routine of the court as a new public event of authority. From the beginning,
forcible recruitment – a policy which had evident links with previous practices
of military slavery, under Turco-Egyptian rule – had been seen by the British as
a desirable spin-oﬀ of patrols against the Nuba Mountains. Policy was to replace
Egyptian soldiers with Sudanese, but few were willing to volunteer, and forcible
recruitment could ﬁll the gap.115 The 500 young men taken by Patrol No. 32 were
an unusually large haul ; but there was otherwise nothing exceptional about this,
112 Beasley, Journal, Apr. 1945, SAD 204/10/2-5; Beasley to ‘Sheila’, 24 June 1945, SAD 657/6/
20-36; Trimingham, ‘The Nuba and Islamic penetration’, n.d. 1942, CMS Nuba Mountains, sub-ﬁles
3–6; for Amina and Islam, see Nadel, The Nuba, p. 485.
113 Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang of the southern Kordofan hills ’, SAD 795/8/161-82, pp. 12–17; cf.
Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 406–12; Stevenson, The Nuba, pp. 100–1, 103. A rather similar disruption of age
rituals elsewhere in the Nuba Mountains – though as a result of Mahdist raids, not Condominium
patrols – is described in J. Faris, ‘South-eastern Nuba age organization’, in I. Cunnison andW. James,
eds., Essays in Sudan ethnography (London, 1972), pp. 1–30, at pp. 2–6, 24.
114 Stevenson, The Nuba, pp. 93, 97.
115 ? toWingate, 9 July 1903, SAD 273/7/12-13; Daly,Empire on the Nile, pp. 113–14; D. Johnson, ‘The
structure of a legacy: military slavery in northeast Africa’, Ethnohistory, 36 (1989), pp. 72–88; GGR, 1907,
pp. 142, 149; Wingate to Asser, 2 Aug. 1908, SAD 283/3/12-22.
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and forced enlistment continued into the early 1920s, explicitly intended as part
of the policy of ‘paciﬁcation ’. The total population of Nyima at the time was
probably less than 30,000; for 500 to be taken oﬀ in a single year suggests a very
substantial impact, and many of these ex-soldiers were to return to the hills after a
few years.116 In 1935 missionaries of the Church Missionary Society, arriving in
Nyima for the ﬁrst time, were very conscious of the impact of these returning
soldiers : ‘ they were our standby and friends and links with the people, they
knew the kind of Arabic we knew … and understood something of English ways ’.
When the governor came to visit the mission’s new church, the behaviour of the
followers of one sheikh revealed their training : ‘The men were standing in two ﬁles
outside the Church with Konia [the sheikh] in front. As the Governor approached
he received a sharp military and unrehearsed salute. ’117
The creation of such a group had been foreseen – indeed desired – by some of
the enthusiasts of forced recruitment, for whom this was one more way of dis-
playing the ‘power of the Government’: ‘young men come back … smart well-
dressed soldiers who know and have seen the power of the Government at
Khartoum etc. and can tell their pals to behave’.118 The peak of the ‘Nuba
renaissance ’ had seen an attempt to stop any enlistment in the army (or at least to
restrict this to a special Nuba unit), lest service undermine traditional authority ;
but even at that time Amina, an Arabic-speaking ex-soldier fond of wearing white
robes and white plimsolls, could become principal mek of Nyima.119 By the early
1940s some British administrators insisted that military service, not tradition,
produced the kind of meks that were needed: ‘[A] bit of army or police work
seems to put some discipline and glimmering of sense into Nuba and sends them
back to their jebels as better citizens and possible leaders. ’120
Ex-soldiers thus became increasingly common as meks and sheikhs across the
NubaMountains in the 1930s, selected in a processwhich had developed into a kind
of semi-rigged and restricted ballot, conducted in public meetings overseen by the
district commissioner at which a crowd of men would express their preferences
from a limited list drawn up the DC in consultation with favoured men.121
116 Gillan, ‘Report on the Tira el Akhdar patrol ’, 8 Nov. 1922, SAD 723/4/13-18; R. Davies, The
camel’s back : service in the rural Sudan (London, 1957), p. 30. At the end of the 1930s the population was
estimated at 37,000 by Nadel, The Nuba, p. 362; Newbold had put it, more modestly, at 26,000: ‘Native
administration inKordofan’, 11 Nov. 1938, SAD 795/8/117-20. The 1955–6 census showed a population
of 38,819: Stevenson, The Nuba people, p. 84. GGR, 1925, p. 68.
117 Note by Elfrida Whidborne, n.d., written on SAD 813/8/27; Nuba Mountains Fellowship
Pamphlet No. 8, June 1937, SAD 813/8/40.
118 Butler to Father, 17 Dec. 1910, SAD 304/8/1-56. See also Balfour to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915,
SAD 196/2/199-200.
119 Gillan, Some aspects of Nuba administration, p. 31 ; Nadel, The Nuba, p. 485; Nuba Mission Pamphlet
No. 3, June 1935, SAD 813/8/21-6.
120 Owen toFather, 14 Jan. 1942,SAD414/13/23-4.Owen toFather, 26Nov. 1943,SAD414/14/58-9.
121 ‘Eastern Jebels, monthly diary ’, Oct. 1934, SAD 695/8/6-8. For ex-soldier meks elsewhere, see
Owen to Father, 20–1 Sept. 1940, SAD 414/11/88-91; Owen, ‘A visit to the Nuba Mountains ’, SAD
769/11/1-19; Owen to Father, 19 Aug. 1941, SAD 414/12/43-5 ; Phillips, ‘Notes on Kadugli sub-district,
Dec. 1947’, SAD 627/4/1-45.
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Stevenson said simply of Nyima that ‘Many of themeks (chiefs) have seen service in
the army’;122 available records do not show how many, but it is evident that,
however many meks had been in the army, the real signiﬁcance of military service
lay in creating a wider body of men familiar with the ‘power of the Government ’,
who had a new perception of the possible role of this power as a means of
furthering their own ambitions. It was the inﬂuence of these men which the
missionaries repeatedly noted in Nyima in the 1930s : ‘We feel like royalty when we
enter a village. The Sheikh is immediately informed and cigarettes, water, eggs
and milk arrive and the ﬂoor is swept … Gau [ex-soldier and sheikh] and the
Nuba police look after us like their own children. ’123 The perception of shared
interests among these men allowed the courts to work, as a DC explained of
Amina’s court (in a language far removed from that of tradition) : ‘The strength
of Amina lies in his capacity to act as a chairman of a meeting. ’124
The possibility of migrant labour had presented a new challenge for heads of
households : how to control the impact of a new access to wealth. Young men had
now a route to accumulation for themselves that lay beyond both the kujurs and
their own fathers : instead of raiding, or herding cattle and cultivating, they could
go to work for wages far from the mountains, as voluntarily enlisted police or
soldiers, as cotton pickers, or in the growing urban economy. By 1950, migrancy
rates among Nyimang young men were running from 15 to 35 per cent.125 At the
same time, oﬃcial encouragement of cotton cultivation, and the growth of a cash
market for simsim, grain, and a variety of lesser items, from chickens to onions,
provided new opportunities for those who could control land and the labour of
younger men and women.126Cotton production grew extraordinarily in the 1930s ;
production of grain for the market also grew, and more consistently.127 Labour
resources, as Nadel observed, were the key determinant which decided whether a
household could plant cotton.128 The early 1930s saw vigorous debate across the
NubaMountains over wage labour and household labour: ‘our sons … now think
not of farm work but of money’, lamented older men (though they too were
thinking of money).129 British observers regarded this debate as an attempt to
maintain tradition in the face of commerce ; but the repeated complaints of mar-
ried men that their sons refused to cultivate for them and preferred to work
122 Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang of the southern Kordofan hills ’, SAD 795/8/161-82, 2.
123 Letter from Elfrida Whidborne, Feb. 1935, SAD 813/8/17.
124 Broadbent, ‘Salara local administration’, 31 Jan. 1939, SAD 795/8/122-4.
125 Nadel, The Nuba, pp. 40, 77 ; Stevenson, The Nuba people, p. 85.
126 GGR, 1933, p. 123. For oﬃcial encouragement of cotton, see Bell, diary, 1 Dec. 1934, SAD 698/7/
122; Nuba Mission Pamphlet No. 3, June 1935, SAD 813/8/21-6.
127 GGR, 1913, p. 211; GGR, 1927, pp. 45, 113; GGR, 1942–4, pp. 164, 167. Daly, Imperial Sudan, p. 96,
records the remarkable increase in cotton growing in the area during the 1930s : much of this crop
was produced by Arabs employing Nuba casual labour, but an increasing proportion – 7 per cent in
1936, but 19 per cent in 1938 – was by people oﬃcially identiﬁed as ‘Nuba’ (GGR, 1936, p. 113; GGR,
1938, p. 113). 128 Nadel, The Nuba, p. 56.
129 Noted in Governor-General Huddlestone’s forward to Nadel, The Nuba, p. xiv.
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for wages might better be seen as part of an attempt to establish wholly new
principles for the control of wholly new opportunities for accumulation.130 By
the 1930s, the principal dynamic of authority in Nyima was no longer compe-
tition between older men for followings of young raiders ; it was competition
between old and young over the control of household resources, and the access
these oﬀered to the accumulative opportunities of the money economy.
As the courts became more important as the public spaces in which authority
was manifested, administrators’ tours lost their previous spectacular, and violent,
air ; instead, as a DC elsewhere in the mountains noted, ‘ [m]ost of our time has
been spent sitting in Resthouses interviewing ‘‘kings ’’ and sheikhs, hearing com-
plaints and inspecting native courts ’. In the course of these new, lower-key, tours
oﬃcials lent their support to meks and sheikhs by arresting ‘young men’ who deﬁed
the judgement of the courts – and the occasional sheikh who tried to revert to a
former pattern by organizing a cattle raid.131 In the absence of any attempt to
mobilize young men as a group for violence, such arrests required only minimal
force, for in each case there would only be one or twomiscreants : and so the ADC,
touring the courts, routinely found himself with a retinue of chained prisoners,
gathered here and there from diﬀerent hills.132
In place of the militarized ‘ tour ’ there was an annual ‘Gathering’ in each sub-
district, to which allmeks and sheikhs would be summoned. The sameADC regarded
these by the 1930s as an opportunity to show oﬀ his mastery of a picturesque and
once-turbulent populace : ‘we want [the governor-general] to realise how ﬁerce
our ‘‘parishioners ’’ are, and we shall do our best to make them well drunk
beforehand! ’ Banking, one presumes, on the thrilling eﬀects of all that nakedness,
he also treated the event as the opportunity for an attempt (unsuccessful, it turned
out) to seduce the governor-general’s daughter. When an accidentally discharged
riﬂe killed a participant at the gathering, the case was referred to a court for
settlement.133 All this was very far from the tense theatres of violence in which meks
and oﬃcials had met only two decades earlier.
V I I
The transition was gradual, and it was not total : the British did not succeed in
creating a ‘decentralized despotism’ in Nyima. Clearly, not all had equal access to
the new instruments of authority, and conﬂicts continued between elder men, as
well as between young and old. The right to control resources and to accumulate
was still contested; and ideas of well-being in particular still oﬀered multiple
130 Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’, p. 199; Nuba Mission Pamphlet No. 5, Apr. 1936, SAD 813/
8/29-34.
131 Bell to ‘Mother andDad’, 2Dec. 1933, 14 Jan., 12Mar. 1934 and 22Aug. 1934, SAD697/11/15-16,
SAD 697/11/32-34 and 55-59; SAD 697/12/27-28.
132 Bell to ‘Mother andDad’, 1Nov. 193 and27Nov. 1934, SAD697/12/62-65andSAD697/12/75-6.
133 Bell to ‘Mother and Dad’, 2 Dec. 1934, 17 Jan., 8 Feb. and 20 Feb. 1936, SAD 697/15/8-9,
SAD 697/15/20 and /27-8.
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potential foci for authority. Manymeks and sheikhs in the 1930s and 1940s combined
position within the court system with other kinds of authority, such as inter-
mediacy with spirits : in Nyima in the late 1930s four out of ﬁve meks and ﬁve out
of thirteen sheikhs had relationships with spirits, possessory or hereditary ; Sheikh
Konia, who sought alliance with the mission and whose subjects saluted the
governor, had also a possessory spirit.134 Clothes could mark alternative roles. A
coloured robe was one widely recognized mark of a relationship with a possessory
spirit ; in the 1920s it had been common practice to give (rather ill-ﬁtting) gowns
to those meks insuﬃciently distinguished to receive a ‘robe of honour’, and by
the 1930s white gowns became standard attire for meks and sheikhs, when meeting
British oﬃcials as well as when sitting in court.135 So it was that in 1941 a district
commissioner encountered a sort of ideological quick-change artist :
I found [the mek] in a sort of night gown, and he bolted like a rabbit into its burrow and
emerged after a little with three layers of rather heavy clothes, the outer robe of which would
have put Joseph to shame … on my suggestion however that it might be more salubrious to
be lighter clad he did another bolt into his hut and reappeared starko.136
Amina, though all descriptions of him refer to his white robes, could be just as
eclectic in other ways. Nadel noted that he had in the late 1930s acquired a new
possessory spirit, modestly named ‘The Whole of the World ’, whose arrival had
been associated with dreams of cars, telegraph poles, district commissioners, and
other ‘emblems ofWestern civilisation’; Amina graciously concurred with Nadel’s
suggestion that perhaps this was a British spirit.137 Events in Nyima revealed just
howmuch Amina – like other meks – was involved in lengthy and complex trials of
strength with possessors of various forms of ritualized power over well-being.138
In July 1952, after a prolonged dry spell, Mek Amina summoned a meeting at
his court-house, the focal point of his authority. A mission worker described
the meeting from her particular standpoint
Mek Amina stood up and harangued the people saying that it was because the people would
not leave their old ways of believing in kujurs and refused to walk in the new ways of
Christianity or Islam that the rain would not come.Many old men stood up in turn and told
how so and so had the rain and then how someone else went and fetched it from him and
there was a lot of talk and the old kujur Tibri had to explain why he had failed utterly to
bring the rain. Then Mek Amina sent them all outside to decide if they wanted to walk in
their old ways or the new ways and there was a lot more talk. When they ﬁnally came back
they said they wanted to walk in their old ways!! So Mek Amina gave his speech all over
again and there was bedlam. Everyone talking and shouting at once.139
134 Nadel,The Nuba, pp. 470–1; NubaMountains Prayer Fellowship Pamphlet No. 9, Feb. 1938, SAD
813/8/41-6. 135 Nadel, ‘A shaman cult ’ ; for gowns, see the photograph SAD 837/7/6.
136 Owen to Father, 28 Oct. 1941, SAD 414/12/56-7. 137 Nadel, The Nuba, p. 443.
138 Ibrahim, The dilemma of British rule, p. 22 ; for prophets, unrecognized as meks, donning rags of
army uniform to meet British oﬃcials, see Hawkesworth, ‘The Nuba proper’, p. 172.
139 Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour D, 23 July 1952, SAD G//S.
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Amina’s dramatic challenge can only be understood in terms of his prolonged
struggle with those who – like him – possessed ritual power, but had unlike him
been excluded from the court. Kujur Tibri, the son of one Abishet who had
contended for power in the early twentieth century, was one of these ; even more
important were the family of Agabna, who had continued to claim powers of rain-
making, and aspired still to be the ‘ tribal patriarchs ’.140 Agabna’s unexpected
reappearance in 1937 – as a possessory spirit, who seized one of his brothers –
apparently prompted Amina’s possession by the ‘Whole of the World ’ spirit, and
Amina had drawn on Islam, mission, and spirits as sources of authority, as well as
on his intermediacy with the state : he was always willing to turn up for public
events at the mission when the DC or governor visited, and hoped to learn
English from the missionaries.141 He also seems to have taken a certain delight
in putting missionaries on the spot with diﬃcult scriptural questions.142 In the
wake of what was in eﬀect a public expression of commitment to a continued
eclecticism in authority, Amina reaﬃrmed the multiple nature of his own claims :
‘You will be interested to hear that Amina after telling his people they must
leave their old ways ; he himself has been kujuring … Yesterday hundreds of
women were working in his ﬁelds so he will bring rain. ’143 Amina’s long balancing
act, however, ended in failure – though not so bloodily as Agabna’s had done. In
1954, as the Condominium drew to an end, he was ﬁnally removed from oﬃce,
through a combination of popular discontent and oﬃcial displeasure. He was
replaced by the mek of Nitl, another Nyima hill – who was also a kujur.144
V I I I
Colonial administrators produced two successive narratives of their engagement
with the Nuba Mountains. The ﬁrst was of the importance of violence in showing
the authority of government and teaching ‘ truculent mountaineers ’ the futility of
resistance: ‘ the various expeditions which have taken place there have at last
convinced the inhabitants that it is useless to ﬁght against the Government
authority ’.145 The second was of the strength of tradition and cultural renaissance :
‘The policy of trying to make the Nuba more self-governing helped to foster his
ancient traditions. ’146 But the eﬀective administration which developed behind
140 Stevenson, ‘The Nyamang of the southern Kordofan hills ’, p. 22, SAD 795/8/161-82. Also see
Rachel Hassan Journal, Tour B, 19 Nov. 1947 and 21 Jan. 1948, SAD G//S 1121 ; Hawkesworth, ‘The
Nuba proper’, p. 165.
141 Whidborne to Mother, 11 Mar. (1935 or 1936), SAD 796/3/13-15; ‘Nuba Mountains station:
report on the general work of the station’, 10 Jan. 1936, SAD 803/9/1-4; Nuba Mission Pamphlet
No. 9, Feb. 1938, SAD 813/8/41-6. For Agabna’s reappearance, see Nadel, The Nuba, p. 444.
142 Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour B, 19 Feb. 1947, SAD G//S 1121.
143 Rachel Hassan, Journal, Tour D, 27 July 1952, SAD G//S 1121.
144 Stevenson, The Nuba people, p. 88; Nadel, The Nuba, p. 412.
145 Wingate to General Hamilton, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD 180/3/79-80; Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar.
1912, SAD 180/3/69-72.
146 Vicars-Miles, ‘Notes on Nuba administration’, p. 28, SAD 631/10/1-64.
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these narratives reﬂected neither the overwhelming ‘power of the Government ’
nor the triumph of refurbished tradition. An awareness of the paucity of coercive
resources which underlay the ‘power of the Government ’, and an intense en-
thusiasm for using such resources as overtly as possible when they were available
drove a semi-theatrical colonial violence up to 1920, and inspired occasional re-
course to large-scale violence thereafter. But from 1920, a new direction to policy
increasingly located authority in a diﬀerent kind of drama: the performance of
the court. In its structures, in its public displays and badges of status the admin-
istration which developed relied upon an accommodation between elder men who
sought to accumulate and a state which was willing to underwrite that accumu-
lation – if necessary with violence. Two linked conclusions might be drawn from
the analysis of Nyima politics suggested here. The ﬁrst is that CondominiumSudan
sawmany of the same policies, and processes, as other parts of Africa under British
rule : here as elsewhere the rhetoric of tradition concealed a reality of violence and
innovation. The second is that this innovation was not all-embracing, nor did it
simply obliterate former ideas of power and authority. The colonial institutions of
local administration – in Nyima, and elsewhere – owed much of their form to
centralized state violence, rather than essentialism, and their culture reﬂected the
forms and models of routine and discipline which characterized the wider state.
This culture of authority was to be carried over into the structure of the post-
colonial Sudan; but so too was the spiritual eclecticism of the populace of Nyima.
The authority of the state, and of the local leaders on whom it relied, rested on
an accommodation which was always uncertain, and prone to collapse.
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